The recent U.S. sanctions on a senior Cuban military official in Beijing underscore a widening confrontation, but the deeper concern is China's enduring intelligence foothold on the island. On August 6, the State Department added Waldo Perez Cortes, Cuba's top military representative in China, to the Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals list, along with five other Cuban nationals and five entities. The official rationale: Cortes facilitated "the procurement of military-related equipment from China to Cuba."
The move may be largely symbolic—those sanctioned are unlikely to hold U.S. assets—but it reflects a broader pressure campaign. Cuba's 10 million residents face daily blackouts, partly due to an almost airtight American energy blockade. Since late January, Washington has intercepted fuel shipments, cut off Venezuelan oil flows after Nicolás Maduro's capture, and threatened sanctions on any country supplying the regime. Yet the blackouts predate these measures; they began in 2024 as fuel imports and domestic production declined, a legacy of decades of mismanagement under the Castros.
The Trump administration, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has escalated efforts to topple the government of Miguel Díaz-Canel, stopping short of invasion. In July, the State Department released a report titled "Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism," which, while hyperbolic, correctly identifies the island as a convergence point for Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran—a "force multiplier" for an anti-American coalition.
Central to that coalition is China's signals intelligence presence. The report notes that Beijing "actively runs three of Cuba's 18 known" such locations, posing "an acute risk to U.S. military operational security." The most prominent is the Lourdes facility near Havana, once the Soviet Union's largest listening post outside its borders, now believed to be under Chinese control since the early 1990s. Other sites include Calabazar, Wajay, and the newer El Salao station. According to R. Evan Ellis of the U.S. Army War College, Chinese operatives may have been in Cuba as early as 1993, well before the 1999 visit of Defense Minister Chi Haotian that some cite as the starting point.
The intelligence relationship is deep, and the stakes are high. "After being surprised by Venezuela, China is attentive to U.S. military action in Cuba but will probably hold on to its strategically valuable electronics and signals intelligence collection facilities until the day they are kicked out," Ellis told me.
So how does Washington dislodge them? Retired Air Force General Blaine Holt suggests a strategy of calibrated harassment. "We can do to the Chinese in Cuba what they do to us in the South China Sea: take actions just below the threshold of war," he said. "Create pain. Stick them with a million pins." He proposes restricting flights in and out of the island to cut off logistics, even joking about denying Chinese personnel their preferred cuisine. "Let's see if the Chinese are happy staying there without, for instance, Chinese food."
But the challenge extends beyond intelligence to energy. China has been helping Cuba with solar power, with panels supplying about 10% of the country's electricity, up from 3% in 2025. As the Wall Street Journal noted, Chinese-provided solar is "offering an unlikely bright spot for a power grid plagued by fuel shortages, crumbling infrastructure and near-daily blackouts." That means any strategy to counter Beijing must also target its renewable energy assistance. Restricting Chinese technology exports could be part of a broader effort to limit Beijing's influence.
The U.S. must also consider the intelligence dimension beyond Cuba, as economic security intelligence becomes critical in this rivalry. Washington's focus on energy blockades is necessary but insufficient; it must address the full spectrum of Chinese activity, from signals intelligence to infrastructure projects. China's cyber capabilities add another layer of risk.
Ultimately, the U.S. needs a comprehensive approach that pressures the Cuban regime while simultaneously undermining China's strategic foothold. As Ellis noted, Beijing will cling to its listening posts until forced out. The question is whether Washington has the resolve to do so without triggering a wider confrontation.
