The current ceasefire between the United States and Iran is anything but stable. Both sides continue to trade strikes in a tit-for-tat pattern even as diplomatic talks proceed. To anyone familiar with history, this is not unprecedented.
During the Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950, negotiations between UN forces and North Korea dragged on for two years and 17 days before a truce was finally signed in July 1953. In that period, roughly 13,000 American service members died—out of a total of about 36,000 U.S. war dead. So the ongoing attacks should come as no surprise.
The critical question for Washington is: what are Tehran's leaders thinking? It is far from clear that the U.S. fully grasps the Iranian perspective—or whether understanding it would change anything. Let’s speculate.
Assuming that internal divisions among Iranian factions are overstated, Tehran likely sees itself in a favorable position. First, Iran’s lead negotiators are far more seasoned than their American counterparts, who are headed by Vice President JD Vance, President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, and real estate associate Steve Witkoff. In contrast, Iran’s team includes Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghachi, both veterans of the 2015 nuclear deal negotiations, backed by deputy foreign ministers Kazem Gharibabadi and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.
Second, Iran understands that its two most powerful strategic levers are the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to influence neighboring Persian Gulf states—countries that are increasingly regretting their support for the U.S.-led war. Third, Tehran must see Trump’s authority as waning. After the House passed a resolution invoking the War Powers Act, the Senate initially followed suit, requiring the president to seek congressional approval for continued military action. Following a reportedly expletive-filled meeting between Trump and Republican senators, the vote was reversed. Yet that reversal reflects a weary Congress and an absence of real war support, as a majority of Americans now want an end to the fighting.
New allegations about Trump’s ties to sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, along with the controversy over a Trump political donor awarded an uncontested contract to overhaul the Reflecting Pool, further signal erosion of his political strength and competence. Supporters argue that Trump’s forceful personality forced the Senate to reverse course, demonstrating strength. And the argument that the U.S. could easily resume bombing if Iran violates the 14-point memorandum of understanding gives Trump another option.
But the memorandum has drawn near-universal criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. If hostilities resume, the Strait of Hormuz would likely be closed, and Iran could still strike its neighbors to distance them from the U.S. Less understood is that the U.S. may be running out of military targets. If Trump tries to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, he would generate huge international animosity, boosting support for Tehran. Tehran also knows that maintaining large U.S. forces in the region degrades them over time, and that restoring those units to full capability will take considerable time.
Having just returned from Norfolk, Virginia, I saw the USS Ford at its pier, covered in rust—a vivid reminder of how corrosive 326 days at sea can be for ships, aircraft, and most importantly, people. It will likely take months to restore the ship to full readiness.
Where is this headed? I began with the Korean War analogy and will end there. How long negotiations will take is unknowable. Continued strikes and counterstrikes may be inevitable. If the just-signed agreement between Israel and Lebanon holds, it could remove one irritant from the talks, as Lebanon is prominent in the memorandum and important to Tehran.
Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council, chairman of a private company, and principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. His next book, co-written with Field Marshal The Lord David Richards, is due out this fall.
